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Abstract 
 
This paper explores the role of meaning making in delineating legitimate 
forms of evidence in policy work and how this positions certain actors 
within the processes of policy formulation.  In particular, the role of 
connotation as a form of interpretation is discussed.  Explained is how 
language, acts and objects function in both constituting and 
communicating the ontological and epistemological assumptions upon 
which a policy rationale may rest.  A case study of the emergence of 
green infrastructure landuse planning policy in Ireland is employed to 
inform and illustrate the paper’s argument.   
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1.0 Introduction 
Wagenaar notes that ‘meanings are not just representations of people’s beliefs and 
sentiments about political phenomena; they fashion these phenomena’ (2011, 3).  
Consequently, meaning making is a form of ‘reality making’, wherein the attributes of 
something – its ontology – is constitued through our perception of it.  Once such an 
ontology is engendered, inferences emerge on how we can and should come to know it– its 
epistemology.  One way in which to investigate how such reality making occurs is by 
focusing on the role of discourse in constructing a ‘shared way of apprehending the world’ 
(Dryzek, 2005, 9).  Here discourse is conceived as a specific and cohesive ensemble of ideas, 
concepts and categorisations that are produced, reproduced and transformed in a particular 
set of practices and against the background of a specific social, temporal and spatial context 
(Epstein, 2008; Hajer, 1995).  In the field of landuse planning, examining both ‘why’ and 
‘how’ actors employ discourse in their meaning making activities offers a window on the 
assumptions upon which the principles of a new planning approach rest.  This is achieved by 
studying how discourses function to regularise both ontological and epistemological 
interpretations of a particular issue, and thus how the basic principles of social action are 
structured in relation to it (Fischer, 2003).  Thus, studying why and how meaning making 
occurs is a way of understanding what makes some forms of knowledge legitimate and 
others not.  In other words, it enables an appreciation of what makes something ‘evidence’.  
Furthermore, attention to meaning making facilitates an examination of how the 
presentation of legitimate forms of evidence may serve as a means for positioning actors in 
planning policy debates and providing the rationale underpinning specific policy 
perspectives.  This paper explores these interrelationships between evidence and meaning 
making through a case study of the emergence of green infrastructure (GI) planning policy in 
Ireland.   
 
2.0 Meaning Making and Evidence in Policy Practice 
Although a broad church of approaches, those engaged in interpretive policy analysis share 
the assumption that all forms of human communication is socially meaningful and that 
these meanings are shaped by social, cultural and political struggles manifested through 
context specific discourses (Hajer, 2011; Fischer and Forrester, 1993; Glynos and Howarth, 
2007; Roe, 1994; Stone, 2002; Yanow and Schwartz-Shea, 2006).  Accordingly, interpretive 
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theorists assert that questions of truth and falsity are not resolved by a theory-independent 
world of phenomena.  Instead, such questions are seen as relative to the standards of 
authentication established by particular systems of knowledge which are embedded in 
specific places during certain periods.  Consequently, the analysis of discourse shifts the 
focus from objective truths to a ‘will to truth’ (Foucault, 1976, 55).  Thus, the task of the 
interpretive policy analyst is not to evaluate whether statements are true or false, but 
rather to investigate how such ‘truths’ are mobilised, for as noted by Epstein (2008, 13), 
‘studying discourses is a means to taking a critical step out of what the discourses actually 
say in order to observe what they do.’  Because professional disciples prescribe what can be 
counted as ‘truths’ within a particular subject area, a significant part of the work done by 
disciplinary discourses is the generation of valid forms of ‘evidence’ (Benton and Rennie-
Short, 1999; Fry and Raadschelders, 2008; Litfin, 1994; Steffek, 2003; 2009).  As the 
perceived legitimacy of landuse policy generally relies on reference to a ‘technical-rational 
model’ (Owens et al., 2004, 1945) of knowledge production1, the capacity of a proposed 
policy to resonate with such technical-rational premises is likely to exert significant 
influence on its adoption by those positioned within planning and allied professional 
disciplines (Freidson, 1986; Petts and Brooks, 2006).  Furthermore, those in a position to 
enunciate such knowledge are likely to assume identities constituted by power 
relationships, and enjoy relative to others, the ability to identify, control, legitimise and 
mobilise the very issues taken to be the subjects of deliberation (Owens, 2005; Owens et al., 
2004; Richardson, 1996; Rydin, 2003; 2007; Rydin et al., 2007).   
 
In examining how meaning making bestows legitimacy upon evidence in policy practice, it is 
important to remain attentive to the role of language, acts and objects as ‘carriers of 
meaning’ (Yanow, 2000, 17).  Such ‘artifacts’ (ibid, 14) comprise symbols that weave a ‘web 
of signification’ (Allan, 2005, 12) in structuring the reality both constituted by, and 
addressed in policy work (Howarth and Torfing, 2005; Stone, 2002).  However, each ‘symbol 
is a social convention’ (Yanow, 2000, 14) whose meaning is broadly agreed upon but not 
delineated (Eder, 1996; Gold and Revill, 2004; Simmons, 1993).  Thus, symbolic artifacts 
(language, acts, objects) communicate through connotation rather than denotation 
                                                     
1
 Flyvbjerg (1998) extends this idea by showing that it is the ‘appearance’ of such rationalities rather than a 
genuine concern with their use that is important in power imbued governing activity.   
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(Edelman, 1964).  Where such symbolic artifacts are perceived to connote knowledge 
legitimated in accordance with accepted disciplinary standards, they may be conceived as 
representing factual statements and thereby meet approval (Ockwell and Rydin, 2006; 
Swaffield, 1998).  Seen in this light, symbolic artifacts can offer the medium through which 
diverse motivations, expectations and values are synchronised to enable accord between 
numerous interests (Cobb and Elder, 1983; Fischer, 2003).  Consequently, they may enable 
the ‘collective centring’ (Hajer and Laws, 2006, 260) that allows constellations of actors to 
coalesce around, and subscribe to, a particular series of assumptions as to ‘what counts as 
real’ (Schiappa, 2003, 178), and as a corollary, what counts as ‘evidence’.  Hence, symbolic 
language, acts and objects may furnish the connotations that ‘will to truth’ (Foucault, 1976) 
interpretations of evidence credibility and the legitimacy of those providing it.  Drawing on 
the scrutiny of documentary material and the analysis of fifty three interviews with actors 
positioned in QANGO and NGO bodies, as well as across national, regional and local level 
planning authorities, this paper will now illustrate how such theoretical concerns play out in 
practice through exploring the emergence of green infrastructure (GI) planning policy in 
Ireland.   
 
3.0 The Emergence of GI Planning in Ireland 
3.1 Prologue 
In November 2008, Fingal County Council organised a GI conference in Malahide, North 
County Dublin, Ireland.  Prior to this conference reference to GI in Irish planning advocacy 
and guidance documentation had been limited (Tubridy and O Riain, 2002; UCD et al., 2008).  
However, in the wake of this event, mention of GI in such documentation increased 
significantly.  By November 2011, the GI planning approach had achieved representation in 
statutory guidance at national, regional and local levels, while also enjoying reference in 
many non-statutory planning policy and advocacy documents.   
 
3.2 Seeing Green 
The initial impetus for introducing the term GI into the Irish planning policy context stems 
from a desire to address ongoing issues of ecosystem degradation perceived as largely 
resulting from habitat fragmentation.  It was widely held among those concerned with 
nature conservation that such habitat fragmentation was consequent on the low profile of 
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nature conservation issues in Irish planning policy formulation.  In response to this, some of 
those seeking to promote the significance of nature conservation in policy development 
sought to establish a means by which to elevate the comparative weight of consideration 
assigned to such issues in landuse planning discussions.  By virtue of widespread familiarity 
with the word ‘infrastructure’, and the associations of indispensability attached to it, those 
advocating the allocation of greater emphasis to nature conservation employed the word 
‘infrastructure’ as a linguistic device facilitating the reconceptualisation of green spaces 
generally from residual areas to locations providing crucial services to society.  This new 
approach thereby relabelled green spaces as GI.  This enabled exponents of this GI approach 
to fashion a ‘narrative of necessity’ with regard to such areas.  However, such a narrative 
served as a carrier of connotative meaning for a broader series of ontological and 
epistemological presumptions on how green spaces should be conceived.  As such, naming 
had effects. 
 
3.3 Naming Effects 
According to Berger and Luckmann (1966, 112), ‘the fundamental legitimating ‘explanations’ 
are...built into vocabulary’.  Central to this is the process of naming.  As noted by Burke 
(1973, 4), ‘the mere act of naming an object or situation decrees that it is to be singled out 
as such-and-such rather than as something other’.  Therefore, the naming process my be 
conceived as process of reality construction (Potter, 1996, 82).  A rhetorical effect of this is 
that it creates the impression that what is named has always existed independent of its 
labelling, and in a sense, was waiting to be discovered as the logical conclusion of 
investigations (Schiappa, 2003, 115).  It is in this context that labelling green spaces as GI 
engendered certain presumptions.  However, a number of those interviewed felt that 
although clearly connoting a presumption of something necessary, the term GI does not 
immediately refer to an obviously defined entity.  Rather, such interviewees suggested that 
what the term signified was initially ambiguous to the interpreter.  This attribute of 
‘ambiguous signification’ meant that reaching apparent clarity of interpretation 
necessitated reasoning what the expression represented by exploring its connotations.  
Although such connotative reasoning ‘works on the subjective level’ (Fiske, 1990, 87), 
Chandler notes that as,  
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Intersubjective responses are shared to some degree by members of a 
culture; with any individual example only a limited range of connotations 
would make any sense.  Connotations are not purely personal meanings – 
they are determined by the codes to which the interpreter has access. 
(Chandler, 2002, 139) 
Echoing concepts theorised by Berger and Luckmann (1966), Fiske outlines how such 
intersubjective responses to interpretation mean that ‘it is often easy to read connotative 
values as denotative facts’ (Fiske, 1990, 87).  It was this feature of associative interpretation 
which led Barthes (1974 (trans. 1974) (1990)) to conclude that connotation may induce the 
illusion of denotation.  In this context, the transition from connotation to apparent 
denotation is conceived as a process of ‘naturalisation’.  Here, the powerful impression that 
what is signified represents a collectively understood literal denotation masks the attributes 
of associative interpretation intrinsic to the sign’s comprehension (Chandler, 2002).  In the 
case of GI, the intersubjective connotative reading of green ‘infrastructure’ as something 
that ‘isn’t just a potential discretionary or stylistic approach’ (Interviewee A7), but rather, as 
‘something you have to have’ (Interviewee C3), facilitated a sense of necessity in the 
associative interpretation of an otherwise ambiguous term.  Indeed, the potency of 
connotations related to the word ‘infrastructure’, and the common familiarity with such 
connotations, elicited a sense of literal denotation of the expression ‘green infrastructure’ 
that partially concealed the process of association required in its interpretation.   
 
It was as a reference to green spaces that most of those interviewed interpreted the word 
‘green’ with respect to the term GI.  However, as noted by many interviewees, the scope of 
spaces represented by the use of the word ‘green’ in the context of the expression ‘green 
infrastructure’ was plentiful.  This was expressed by one planning authority officer when he 
suggested,  
...the word green you know, it can encompass anything to do with the 
natural environment really...So when you’re talking about green you could 
be talking about golf courses, you could be talking about park lands, you 
could be talking about the open countryside. It gives you broad scope I 
suppose to examine the area that you want to. (Interviewee B2) 
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External to the expression ‘green infrastructure’, the word ‘infrastructure’ is a noun seen to 
designate,  
...the building blocks for planning and for designing towns and framing 
investment and so you have transport infrastructure, water services 
infrastructure... (Interviewee B16) 
...it’s a word that extends from the historic use of if from road and rail, that 
kind of thing... (Interviewee D2) 
Infrastructure is in some ways you know, roads, power lines, harbours, 
airports, that to me is, is a country’s infrastructure. (Interviewee C6) 
Thus, assembling the words ‘green’ and ‘infrastructure’,  
...bends the understanding a little bit...it’s possible to build it into the 
context of sort of grey infrastructure, IT infrastructure and so on. All of 
which are very sort of concrete, sort of visible things on the ground. 
(Interviewee A4) 
The manner in which the conjunction of these words generated a metaphor that fostered a 
reconceptualisation of green space necessitates an understanding of the way the two words 
are asymmetrically positioned relative to each other in terms of how they perform their 
meaning endowing functions.  Ivor Richards (1936 (1965)) provided insight into this by 
proposing the comprehension of metaphor as the unity of an underlying idea with the 
means employed in its conveyance.  The former he terms the ‘tenor’, while the latter he 
calls the ‘vehicle’.  In the present case, the idea (tenor) which the advocates of GI sought to 
convey was the importance of green spaces.  The vehicle used to communicate this tenor 
(idea) was the expression ‘green infrastructure’.  However, as stressed by Paul Ricoeur, ‘The 
metaphor is not the vehicle alone but the whole made of the two halves’ (Ricoeur, 1975 
(trans.1977)(2002), 93).  It follows that use of the term ‘green infrastructure’ (vehicle) to 
convey the importance of green space (tenor) not only achieved the manifest objective of 
the communicative act, but also altered perceptions on how the significance of green space 
was conceived.  Max Black (1968) suggests that this alteration transpires by the work of 
metaphor in ‘organising’ our interpretation of what is being conveyed.  With regards to GI, 
the subject ‘organised’ is the word ‘green’ (green space), while that engaged in organising is 
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the word ‘infrastructure’.  The effect of this organising of interpretation was outlined by one 
planner when commenting, 
Infrastructure is like an underlying framework for a particular system or 
feature of a system. So basically what you’re looking at is the idea of green 
in terms of, well green areas, green spaces or whatever you want to 
encompass in the term green and then putting that in a context so you 
actually have a framework for developing or understanding, a methodology 
or an approach to developing the idea of how you use these spaces or 
areas and what you use them for. So when you put the two of them 
together you actually do get quite a useful phrase in terms of creating 
infrastructure... (Interviewee B2) 
Hence, forging the metaphor ‘green infrastructure’ enabled the configuration of specific 
ontological and epistemological interpretations as to the nature of green spaces (‘green’), 
their appropriate functions, and how these areas can be planned (‘infrastructure’).  In this 
sense, ‘green infrastructure’ became a conceptual metaphor.   
 
In their seminal study of metaphor’s capacity to direct thought, Lakoff and Johnson (2003) 
identify categories of conceptual metaphors, as ontological or structural.  Ontological 
metaphors enable the conceptualisation of ‘things, experiences and processes, however 
vague and abstract, as if they have definite physical properties’ (Knowles and Moon, 2006, 
40).  Structural metaphors facilitate the structuring of one concept in terms of another.  
Conceptual metaphor theorists hypothesise that metaphors form systematic sets of 
correspondences, or ‘mappings’ across conceptual domains (Semino, 2008), where the 
‘source domain’ is used to describe the concept area from which the metaphor is drawn, 
and the ‘target domain’ is used to identify the concept area to which the metaphor is 
applied (Knowles and Moon, 2006).  Under this model, source domains supply frameworks 
for target domains, which subsequently determine the manner by which the entities of the 
target domains are conceived and discussed (ibid).  However, as is noted by Lakoff and 
Johnson (2003, 264), these categories are not mutually exclusive, but rather, ‘All metaphors 
are structural (in that they map structures to structures); all are ontological (in that they 
create target domain entities).’  Therefore, the evocations inherent to metaphorical 
mapping from source to target domains not only specify an ontology for that which is 
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conveyed, but also stipulate an associated epistemology that structures responses to such 
metaphorically induced realities.   
 
Applied to the term ‘green infrastructure’, such an understanding suggests the conceptual 
organisation of green spaces (‘green’) through reference as ‘infrastructure’.  This occurs by 
mapping associations from commonly conceived notions of infrastructure (source domain) 
onto comprehensions of what green space planning entails (target domain).  Thus, as noted 
by one consultant, 
It’s looking at open space resources as we would grey infrastructure. We 
have a piece of land, a resource, what do we want it to do. How much of 
that do we want it to do. So you plan and design for that and then you can 
measure its performance. (Interviewee A2) 
Several interviewees alluded to the force of metaphorical reasoning in forging an 
understanding of ‘green infrastructure’ that is commensurate with conventionally conceived 
‘infrastructure’.  As noted by one planner, 
I think it’s a clever combination of words and that infrastructure suggests 
systems and mechanics and planning and all of those things, you know, it’s 
kind of scientific in its nature. (Interviewee A2) 
This metaphorical transference from the source to target domain of ‘systems’, ‘mechanics’ 
and ‘scientific’ associations in the reconceptualisation of green space functions 
consequently influenced the interpretation as to how approaches to planning for such areas 
should be conducted.  Indeed, most of those questioned felt that a GI approach to green 
space planning was a rational process utilising a coherent methodology in the deduction of 
conclusions from scientifically assembled evidence.  In this context, one planner asserted,  
It’s thinking of that connectivity and those green spaces as traditionally you 
would think of physical infrastructure...you’re doing it in some methodical 
way. There’s an evidence base underpinning what you’re trying to 
achieve...you’re doing this rationally. (Interviewee E4) 
Such perceptions of GI planning as following a ‘technical-rational model’ (Owens et al., 
2004, 1945) of knowledge production engendered presumptions as to what counts as 
evidence and who can enunciate upon it.  Specifically, the interpretation of GI planning as 
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‘scientific in its nature’ (Interviewee A2) necessitated a capacity to discuss versions of the 
world construed as objective, factual and impersonal.  Consequently, the perceived 
legitimacy of GI knowledge claims required the apparent evacuation of ostensible interest-
motivation from the production and dissemination of information ascertained in analysing 
this independent reality.  This concern surrounding the appearance of neutrality in the 
structuring and communication of knowledge claims has been termed ‘stake inoculation’ 
(Potter, 1996).  Accordingly, those best able to produce an effect of apparent ‘stake 
inoculation’ in the evidence they presented were seen as the most trustworthy enunciators 
of GI knowledge claims.  Documentary and interview research undertaken suggests that 
specific mechanisms were drawn upon to both explicitly and implicitly convey the 
inoculation of interests or ‘stake’ in the production of GI knowledge (evidence).  Such 
research indicates the centrality of cartography in this process.  Research similarity indicates 
that those advocating GI endeavoured to bolster the legitimacy of their proclamations by 
comparison with what they labelled as GI planning activities occurring in other countries.  
Also evident was the role played by quantification in facilitating the appearance of 
neutrality.   
 
3.4 Cartographic Evidence 
As discussed above, the form of reasoning inherent to GI’s comprehension engenders 
associations of ‘systems’, ‘mechanics’ and the ‘scientific’ that elicit perceptions of the 
technical-rational model of planning activity associated with conventionally conceived 
‘infrastructure’.  Resultant from such inferences is the assumption that a significant element 
of the ‘evidence based’ for GI planning rests in conducting analyses and presenting 
conclusions in a fashion similar to that for conventionally conceived ‘grey infrastructure’ 
(roads, sewage, drainage etc).  For most of those interviewed this entailed a prioritisation of 
cartography.  As noted by the Irish Sustainable Development Council, 
The collection, mapping and analysis of data to arrive at a plan for 
development and management of natural areas, open space and related 
resources - is commonly recognised as the crux of Green Infrastructure 
planning. (Comhar, 2010, 63) 
This foregrounding of cartography in GI discourses may be traced to what MacEachren 
(1995) distinguishes as connotations of ‘veracity’ and ‘integrity’.  These are specified as the 
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implications of temporal and attributive precision commonly associated with impressions of 
accuracy in mapping and the presumption of impartiality in the activities of scientifically 
schooled cartographers.  Both interview and documentary data indicate that it was such 
suppositions of cartographic fidelity with an objective reality that gave weight to mapping as 
the means by which to furnish the ‘evidence base’ in GI policy formulation.  As noted by one 
planner involved in the production of GI documentation, 
Well evidence in this case is obviously proper mapping, proper survey, 
proper mapping of the various elements which go into the resource, the 
natural biodiversity, the amenity, the cultural aspects all of those things, 
now that’s very important as the evidence base, surveying it, mapping it 
and capturing it and then on that basis you proceed forward and make 
decisions on that.  So it shouldn’t be policy or ideas that come basically 
shooting from the hip, it needs to be chased back into proper planning 
process. (Interviewee A10) 
Such condensation of ‘scientific’ legitimacy in cartography involves shaping that which is 
presented in the context of the map audience’s epistemological assumptions and 
ontological expectations.  As stated by Kitchin et al.,  
Mapping is epistemological but also deeply ontological – it is both a way of 
thinking about the world, offering a framework for knowledge, and a set of 
assertions about the world itself. (Kitchin et al., 2009, 1)  
Thus, the focus on mapping in GI planning activities not only embodied presumptions on 
legitimate forms of evidence, it also structured perceptions of the reality it claimed to 
represent.  Consequently, the ‘will to truth’ channelled through cartography enabled map 
authors to legitimately expound ‘an’ interpretation of GI as ‘the’ interpretation via reference 
to an apparent objective reality.  In other words, it allowed map authors to legitimately 
proclaim the ‘facts’ of a situation from an advantageous enunciative position via appeal to 
the seeming objectivity engendered by stake inoculation.  Put simply, maps legitimated that 
which was enunciated. 
 
For a map to convey a ‘truth’ relative to the suppositions of its audience, the activity of map 
making must be selective in content.  Thus, ‘to present a useful and truthful picture, an 
accurate map must tell white lies’ (Monmonier, 1991, 1).  Accordingly, selectivity 
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requirements permit the use of maps as devices that channel interpretation by highlighting 
and discounting the aspects of the reality its author’s seek to construct.  As such, maps are 
both instruments of communication and a means of persuasion.  This capacity for maps to 
influence how reality is legitimately presented enables cartography to serve as a theory-
constitutive and exegetical exercise by stipulating what elements of the world are open for 
interpretation and how these are to be deciphered.  However, the assumption of 
cartography’s veracity and integrity masks such processes, and in doing so, inoculates their 
author’s from accusations of interest-motivation.  Maps thereby provide a powerful 
mechanism in the presentation of potentially subjective knowledge claims as scientifically 
legitimated and objective ‘evidence’.   
 
The requirement to interpret GI’s meaning via those connotations engendered by its 
metaphorical properties stimulated assumptions of GI planning as the mapping and 
provision of green spaces as ‘infrastructure’.  This reconceptualisation of green spaces 
transformed their perception from the ‘left over space...the stuff you haven’t zoned’ 
(Interviewee E4) to ‘infrastructure’ that services the development requirements of society 
while concurrently assisting the conservation of biodiversity.  In this sense it is assumed 
that, 
Green infrastructure provides a wide range of invaluable ecosystem 
services and human quality of life benefits including:  
 biodiversity management and enhancement  
 water management including drainage and flood attenuation, 
filtration and pollution control  
 recreation and tourism  
 visual amenity and sense of place  
 sustainable mobility  
 food, timber and other primary production  
 regulation of micro-climates (green lung) and, potentially, climate 
change adaptation (UF and IEEM, 2010, 2) 
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By mapping areas to facilitate the planning and provision of this array of perceived GI 
functions, the scientific legitimacy afforded to cartographic activities prompted the 
apparent rational interpretation of anthropocentrically orientated green space development 
as concurrently facilitating environmental conservation.  In this sense, such maps were 
employed as potent tools in the generation of appropriate and desired landuse functions 
wherein they ‘effected actualization’ (Corner, 1999, 225) of the objective facts constituting 
spatial realities.  As such, maps acted productively in helping to engender green space 
ontologies and in furnishing the evidence for the rational planning of landuses.  Consequent 
to this wide range of spatial functions, those who advocated GI as a planning approach 
frequently employed cartography as evidence in constructing a reality of functional 
coexistence within spaces by encompassing multiple landuses beneath the rubric of GI.  
Indeed, although originally conceived as a means by which to give weight to nature 
conservation issues in planning policy discussions (Tubridy and O Riain, 2002), GI had over 
the 2008-2011 period assumed a series of ever expanding multifunctional properties.  No 
longer confined to biodiversity conservation, it progressively encompassed recreational, 
economic development, conventional infrastructural, aesthetic and agricultural functions.  
Paralleling this increasing multitude of interpretations was the disbanding of fixed 
conceptual categories defining what GI ‘is’, and by corollary, ‘is not’.  Ultimately, this 
involved the dissolution of unifunctional landuse categories (conservation, recreation, 
transport etc) and the legitimation of new spatial realities through the productive power of 
the ‘evidence’ supplied by cartography.   
 
3.5 Comparative Evidence  
Another prominent stake inoculating mechanism identified as employed by GI advocates 
was comparison.  Central to this was the relationship between the identity of those 
referencing an evidence claim, those identified as producing such a claim, and that upon 
which the claim was made.  The stake inoculating potentials and properties of such 
relationships were explored by Erving Goffman and elucidated in his theory of ‘footing’ 
(1981).  Goffman’s hypothesis refines presumptions on the simple distinction between 
addresser and addressee by theorising the various roles transcending this dichotomy 
through proposing a threefold typology of reference. These are namely the principal, whose 
position the piece of speech is supposed to represent; the author, who does the scripting; 
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and the animator, who says the words.  Considered together, these elements of reference, 
‘can be said to tell us about the “production format” of an utterance’ (ibid, 145).  These 
distinctions between principal, author and animator may be employed to exert influence on 
the appearance of neutrality as they can position the ‘animator’ as ‘just passing something 
on’ (Potter, 1996, 143), – in this case, that which the ‘author’ has produced regarding the 
‘principal’.  The role played by footing in effecting stake inoculation can be observed in the 
prevalence of ‘comparison’ as evidence in discourses on GI planning in Ireland.  This was 
postulated by a number of interviewees and expressed by one local authority officer when 
concluding, 
One advantage I found in trying to do something new or different is if you 
can show that another county has done it and what they’ve used the 
information for, then it can be very valuable. (Interviewee B3) 
Indeed, the expanding variety of functions seen as delivered by GI (see section 3.4 above), 
was reflected in the diversity of identified and referenced GI activities promoted as offering 
models for green space planning (principal).  In seeking the legitimacy bequeathed by 
perceptions of objectivity, those advocating the application of such exemplars (animators) 
cited particular examples (authors) detailing where such planning approaches have been 
applied.  Interestingly, those advocating (animators) different interpretations of green space 
planning (principal), referenced different examples (authors) of GI activities dependant on 
the specific comprehension of GI that they were forwarding, be it for flood mitigation, 
recreation, mental health, biodiversity conservation etc.  Therefore, a feature of Irish GI 
advocacy was the use of ‘footing’ to achieve stake inoculation in the promotion of specific 
perspectives on green space planning by bestowing on such perspectives the legitimacy of 
apparent impartiality demanded by practitioner self-assessment of planning as a scientific 
‘evidence based’ discipline.  In essence, advocates employed ‘comparison’ as a means to 
confer enunciative advantage on their particular aspirations for green space planning. 
 
3.6 Quantifiable Evidence 
Also evident in many policy documents and interviews regarding GI was reference to 
numerical data and the processes of quantification.  Underpinning such references was the 
connotatively reasoned comparability of GI with conventionally conceived ‘grey 
infrastructure’ wherein quantitative methodologies were presumed as inherent to its 
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delivery.  Furthermore, stake inoculation via quantification helped to conceal the normative 
impetus of counting activities by force of appeal to the perceived objective methodologies 
of scientific measurement.  In this way, the act of counting served to veil a normative 
function by implying an unprejudiced imperative to do something.  As noted by Deborah 
Stone, measuring frequently implies ‘a need for action, because we do not measure things 
except when we want to change our behaviour in response to them’ (2002, 167).  
Accordingly, acts of quantification were employed in the production of forceful evidence to 
signal a requirement for action.  Similar to cartography, such acts of quantification were also 
used to furnish the evidence that produced the realities for the policy activity sought by 
those involved in the counting process.  In this context, and with reference to GI, one 
interviewee stressed that, 
Until you can come up with a method of actually quantifying it, and 
mapping and quantifying it and making it real, then they’re just concepts, 
you know, they’re not that meaningful for people. (Interviewee C8) 
Indeed, the legitimating and issue highlighting functions of counting were ardently 
forwarded by certain parties to the GI advocacy discourse and can be observed in the 
endeavours of the Irish Sustainable Development Council (SDC) to present GI as an 
objectively assessed economic benefit.  Playing a central role in the advocacy of a GI 
planning approach in Ireland, arguments for GI advanced by the SDC were frequently 
focused on the ‘monetarisation’ of natural ‘assets’ wherein a cost-benefit analysis of the 
value of ecosystems to national economic growth was foregrounded. 
 
Expounding this perspective, the director of the SDC presented an economics centred 
argument for the introduction of multifunctional GI planning at the Irish Planning Institute’s 
Annual Conference in April 2010 (Comhar, 2010c).  The SDC’s presentation at this event 
employed references to initiatives by the United National Environmental Programme, the 
New Economics Foundation, the Grantham Research Institute as well as its own ‘Towards a 
Green New Deal’ document (Comhar, 2009) to present GI as a multifaceted environmentally 
sensitive approach that can help reverse the costly loss of ecosystems services.  This 
approach endorsement a cost-benefit argument for the adoption of GI planning and was 
sustained by the SDC in other presentations (Comhar, 2010d).  In the same month, the SDC 
hosted a workshop on The Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity (Comhar, 2010a).  This 
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workshop involved a plenary session wherein a series of presentations were provided 
outlining the economic worth of biodiversity and the methodologies that can be employed 
in its valuation.  Specific group discussions on the role of GI in enhancing the ‘value’ of 
ecosystems were organised.  This numerical assessment of GI was reflected when in August 
2010, the SDC published a detailed GI advocacy document (Comhar, 2010b).  With a focus 
on an economic calculus of GI’s value, the report recommends as a priority the, 
Identification, quantitatively and qualitatively of the economic and social 
benefits of ecosystem services delivered by Green Infrastructure in 
monetary terms and also the social gains to health and quality of life. (Ibid, 
23) 
In such instances, quantifying the economic worth of GI may be seen as a means by which to 
remove it from possible associations with ex-ante value rationalities (Kornov and Thissen, 
2000; Owens et al., 2004) and foreground a mathematically determined instrumental 
rationality for its introduction.  Here, a positivist repertoire grounded in numeracy was 
employed to present arguments as founded on externalised facts by ‘divesting agency from 
fact constructors and investing it in facts’ (Potter, 1997, 158).  In doing so, an attempt at 
stake inoculation of those ‘facts’ was made simultaneous to conveying the important story 
about which ‘the facts speak for themselves’.  It is under such circumstances that 
normatively founded proclamations on what is believed to be requisite action obtain the 
enunciative advantage of scientific legitimacy by the seemingly objective ‘evidence base’ 
upon which planning is viewed to operate.   
 
4.0 Conclusion 
This paper endeavours to demonstrate the importance of attending to the symbolic role of 
language, acts and objects as both constituting and carrying the meanings of ‘evidence’ in 
policy work.  Extrapolating from a case study of the emergence of GI planning policy in 
Ireland, this paper attempts to illustrate how contextually contingent linguistic associations 
prompt ontological and epistemological assumptions subsequently consolidated through 
the symbolic attributes of certain acts (cartography, comparison, counting) and objects 
(maps).  
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Shown is that attention to the influence of language in constituting the reality of policy is a 
requisite for understanding how different forms of evidence are bestowed legitimacy within 
a specific context.  Such attention demands that ‘language becomes part of data analysis for 
inquiry, rather than simply a tool for speaking about an extra linguistic reality’ (Shapiro, 
1981, 14).  Appreciating this constitutive role requires consideration of ‘what happens when 
people draw on the knowledge they have about language...to do things in the world’ 
(Johnstone, 2007, 3).  Drawing on such knowledge entails mediating communication 
through the context contingent linguistic conventions that supply the pre-conditions for the 
process of discourse formation (Lemke, 1998, 91).  Specifically, by laying emphasis on the 
selective and abstractive functions of naming, this paper draws attention to how the 
process of labelling simultaneously abbreviates the complex while specifying the ontological 
status of that which is named.  Through means of connotation, epistemological suppositions 
are subsequently provoked.  A rhetorical effect of this process is that it creates the 
impression that what is named has always existed independent of its labelling and was 
waiting to be discovered as the logical conclusion of enquiry (Schiappa, 2003, 115).  This 
paper demonstrates how the capacity of naming to engender such effects is dependent on 
an ability to resonate with the ontological and epistemological presuppositions of existing 
context contingent practices.  Where the language used in naming is ambiguous, 
connotation rather than denotation is necessitated.  Here, interpretation via association 
with familiar concepts is required.  Nevertheless, through repeated citation and expanding 
actor ascription, the boundaries between connotation and denotation may become blurred 
over time as an apparent stability of meaning emerges.  Consequently, those advocating a 
particular policy whose comprehension is founded on connotations reasoned from a label, 
are linguistically forming and communicating an interpretation of reality by offering a 
description that functions in defining or redefining something without necessarily 
acknowledging that a new perspective is being promoted.  As such, reasoning by 
connotation evolves into denotation as a ‘will to truth’ (Foucault, 1976, 55) that defines 
reality and delineates what counts as evidence in respect of it.  Thus,  
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Language is capable not only of constructing symbols that are highly 
abstracted from everyday experience, but also of ‘bringing back’ these 
symbols and appresenting them as objectively real elements in everyday 
life.  In this manner, symbolism and symbolic language become essential 
constituents of the reality of everyday life and of the common-sense 
apprehension of this reality. (Berger and Luckmann, 1966, 55)   
However, this form of reality making is not neutral.  Rather, it specifies the positions from 
which legitimate enunciations can be issued.  In particular, this paper demonstrates how 
conceiving GI as analogous to conventional infrastructure induces a presumption that those 
who can produce knowledge claims congruent with the methods normally applied in 
traditionally understood ‘grey infrastructure’ (roads, sewers, drainage etc), enjoy the ability 
to pronounce on the reality to which GI policy can and should apply.  In this way, meaning 
making prompted by naming may be viewed as not only specifying what constitutes credible 
evidence but also who is legitimately positioned to produce it.  As these forms of evidence 
operate in recursively consolidating the interpretation of the reality that gives force to the 
enunciations of those who pronounce upon it, labelling can be viewed as enhancing the 
positions of certain actors through engendering a knowledge-identity-power nexus. 
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